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Abstract
This paper studies the legislation on bankruptcy introduced into Brazil by D.
Jo˜ ao VI (1808-1821) and shows how this legislation was used in this period as
an instrument of protection for certain speciﬁc economic activities. On one hand,
this work deliberately seeks to incorporate institutions into the study of Brazilian
economic history, based on the assumption that the lack of interest in the role
played by these institutions has hindered a better understanding of the country’s
economic development during the Nineteenth Century. On the other hand, this paper
introduces new material for the purpose of re-assessing the economic policies enforced
in this period. In fact the study of the bankruptcy legislation suggests that one of
the Government’s main concern at the time was to promote the development of
activities directly related to gold and sugar exports. Therefore the general and popular
acceptance of the revolutionary character of the economic policy in this period is
challenged.
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JEL Classiﬁcation: N26
Resumo
Este trabalho estuda a legisla¸ c˜ ao sobre falˆ encias implementada no per´ ıodo Joanino
(1808-1821) e mostra como essa legisla¸ c˜ ao foi usada no per´ ıodo como um instrumento
de prote¸ c˜ ao a determinados setores da atividade econˆ omica. Por um lado, o trabalho
tem o prop´ osito deliberado de incorporar as institui¸ c˜ oes no estudo da hist´ oria
econˆ omica do per´ ıodo, considerando que um descaso sobre o papel das institui¸ c˜ oes
na hist´ oria da economia do pa´ ıs tem prejudicado um melhor entendimento do
desenvolvimento econˆ omico observado no pa´ ıs ao longo do s´ eculo XIX. Por outro
lado, o trabalho tem o prop´ osito de trazer subs´ ıdios para uma reavalia¸ c˜ ao da pol´ ıtica
econˆ omica de D. Jo˜ ao VI. De fato o estudo da legisla¸ c˜ ao sobre falˆ encias implementada
no per´ ıodo sugere que o principal objetivo do Governo era promover o desenvolvimento
de atividades direta ou indiretamente relacionadas ` a produ¸ c˜ ao de ouro e a¸ c´ ucar.
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Portanto, o trabalho questiona vis˜ ao da pol´ ıtica econˆ omica joanina, como uma pol´ ıtica
econˆ omica revolucion´ aria, vis˜ ao predominante entre os historiadores econˆ omicos.
Palavras-Chave: Institui¸ c˜ oes, Falˆ encias, Legisla¸ c˜ ao, D. Jo˜ ao VI
Classiﬁca¸ c˜ ao JEL: N26
1. Introduction
Changes in Brazilian bankruptcy law introduced in Brazil in 2004 providing
improved conditions for the recovery of indebted ﬁrms have been seen as
a major step towards modernization of Brazilian legislation. The new law
expresses a greater concern of economic policy for growth and employment
rather than with the safeguarding of creditors’ rights. Such a trend is not
new in Brazilian history. It prevailed in colonial times as part of a package of
incentives introduced by Portugal to promote economic activities in its colonies
in accordance with the purposes embodied in the mercantilist policies then
prevailing.
Considering the deﬁnition of institutions as “the rules of the game in
a society, or more formally...the humanly designed constraints that shape
human interaction”, 1 one cannot say that the relevance of institutions in
shaping Brazilian economic development in the Nineteenth Century has been
either denied or ignored by economic historians. However, studies of these
impacts have not followed the principles and methodology suggested by recent
literature. The eﬀects of institutions on economic growth have been mostly
assumed and not duly investigated. Consequently, some spurious relationships
of cause and eﬀect have been established and become widely accepted. This
has been the case, for instance, for one type of institution, the rules embodied
in legal texts. On one hand, such institutions are many times called forth
to explain developments that took place in the economy without major
investigation regarding their ability to account for the phenomena observed. On
the other hand, the possibilities that such institutions may be the explanation
for the course of certain events are frequently not even taken into consideration.
Even though some exceptions may be always mentioned, these attitudes reveal
a certain lack of interest in the real role played by legislation in shaping the
observed development. Laws have not been properly studied, leading economic
historians either to ignore signiﬁcant institutional changes, or to misinterpret
them.
⋆ Submitted in November 2006, accepted in August 2007.
E-mail address: teresa74@unb.br.
1 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge
USA, 1990.
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The study of the origins of Brazilian industrialization in the Nineteenth
Century is a good example of this claim. Although the literature has emphasized
the role of protective policies as responsible for attracting investments in
industrial production, most of these studies are restricted to ﬁscal privileges:
concession of ﬁnancial subsidies, exemption or reduction of import tariﬀs on
machinery and inputs, prohibitive import tariﬀs on similar products, etc.
Such privileges, either reducing the costs of production for domestic ﬁrms
or enlarging the demand for their products, would have given rise to more
favourable forecasts regarding the proﬁtability of the sector. Protection given
to industry by means of other institutions, such as bankruptcy legislation, has
been overlooked.
As to the speciﬁc period of the Government of D. Jo˜ ao VI, a few pieces
of legislation towards industries enacted by D. Jo˜ ao VI in 1808-1810 have
been viewed by some economic historians as revealing an oﬃcial purpose of
developing manufactures in the country, a scheme which would have been
rendered ineﬀective by the Commercial Treaty of 1810 that gave privileged
import tariﬀs to British products. Such was, for instance, the point of view
of Roberto C. Simonsen in 1937, later on extended by N´ ıcia V. Luz. 2
Furtado was the ﬁrst to minimize the eﬀects of the Commercial Treaty of
1810 in delaying the emergence of an industry in Brazil and to doubt that
“an intelligent policy of industrialization” could have been implemented in a
country dominated by a class of great landowners”.3 This notwithstanding,
Alice P. Canabrava’s observation in 1962 that most of the historical studies on
Brazilian industrialization date the start of the modern Brazilian industry to
the D. Jo˜ ao VI period still seems valid. 4
Nonetheless, prevailing bankruptcy regimes may have signiﬁcant eﬀects on
economic performance and changes to such regimes have been used from
colonial times to our days as one of the protective devices intended to direct
investments to speciﬁc sectors.
Any person or ﬁrm unable to pay their debts is insolvent. If their state of
insolvency is legally recognized, they become bankrupt. Once acknowledged as
bankrupts, the payment of their debts must be made according to bankruptcy
laws and, when this is the case, they may become subject to legal penalties.
According to the legislation in force, losses from individual bankruptcies may
be extended to ﬁrms as long as they are entirely or partially owned by bankrupt
individuals. Thus, the bankruptcy of a ﬁrm may result from bad administration
– fraudulent or not –, from unfavourable fortuitous business conditions and from
individual bankruptcies of their owners.
2 Roberto C. Simonsen, Hist´ oria Econˆ omica e Pol´ ıtica do Brasil (1500/1820), 6
a ed., S˜ ao Paulo,
1969), p. 397. Simonsen’s book was published for the ﬁrst time in 1937. N´ ıcias Vilela Luz, A Luta
pela industrializa¸ c˜ ao do Brasil (1808-1930), S˜ ao Paulo, 1961, pp. 13–17
3 Celso Furtado, Forma¸ c˜ ao Econˆ omica do Brasil, S˜ ao Paulo, 1970, p. 107.
4 Alice Piﬀer Canabrava, Hist´ oria Econˆ omica: Estudos e Pesquisas, S˜ ao Paulo, p. 86.
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The consequences of ﬁrms’ bankruptcies are not restricted to the expulsion of
ineﬃcient ﬁrms from the market. According to the nature of the ﬁrm, its size,
and the characteristics of its production process, such consequences may extend
at diﬀerent rates of speed and diﬀerent degrees of intensity to other ﬁrms and
sectors. Considering that bankruptcy laws establish the legal limits to property
rights of creditors and debtors, alterations to those laws and changes in these
limits may have signiﬁcant results on the performance of the economy as a
whole.
Changes to bankruptcy laws have diﬀerent eﬀects, not only among various
ﬁrms, but also among diﬀerent agents involved directly or indirectly in the
productive process of this ﬁrm. Legal measures protecting the property rights
of the owners over the ﬁrms’ assets clearly reduce their individual risks. Such
a reduction in risks, everything else being constant, will favour investments
in these ﬁrms and, as far as labour is concerned, will provide a safeguard
against unemployment in the case a ﬁrm becomes insolvent. However, it
must be considered that, given such increased protection, the ﬁrm may face
credit restrictions as creditors might perceive their property rights as adversely
aﬀected. Therefore, the concession of privileged bankruptcy legislation for
speciﬁc ﬁrms or sectors may work as an eﬃcient protective device only if their
protective eﬀects are not counteracted by the adverse eﬀects on the availability
of credit.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of bankruptcy legislation as
one of the instruments of economic policy used by the Government of D. Jo˜ ao VI
(1808- 1821) by means of a thorough examination of the legal texts promulgated
in this period. This policy, stimulating investments in the production of
commodities like gold and sugar, had long-term eﬀects on the development
of the Brazilian economy in the Nineteenth Century, The assumption is that
such legislation was part of a package of economic policy measures imposed
for the main purpose of increasing revenues collected by the government in
order to meet the increased costs of the Portuguese administration. In this
sense the paper expands Furtado’s argument, mentioned above. It would not
be reasonable to expect the implementation of an eﬃcient policy towards
industrialization by a government which heavily depended on revenues provided
by international trade.
The period under examination is particularly interesting as it was a time
of transition from a colonial regime to an independent government. In fact, as
far as Latin-American countries are concerned, the transfer of the Portuguese
Court to Brazil, in 1808, and D. Jo˜ ao VI’s stay in Brazil until 1821 created
conditions for a singular experience of transition from colonial to independent
status. Not only was the transition relatively peaceful, there was no drastic
rupture of institutions. On the contrary, as it has been pointed out by
some authors, the government of D. Jo˜ ao VI restricted itself to transplanting
Portuguese institutions to Brazil. In fact, the administrative apparatus required
by the Government to exercise its functions from its new seat was copied from
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that existing in Lisbon, without taking into consideration the peculiarities of
the new setting where the court was being established.
However, the impact of a great and most diversiﬁed set of external factors
called for changes in the institutions. Such changes were introduced through
legislation suitable to the new role to be played by the colony under the changed
circumstances. New institutions were created and old ones modiﬁed in order
to build an institutional structure compatible with an altered economic and
political situation. The new institutional arrangements, the result of exogenous
factors, were to be bequeathed to the independent Government of D. Pedro I
in 1822.
As far as insolvency is concerned, D. Jo˜ ao VI’s legislation for the colony
followed the same pattern as that in Portugal. No general law on bankruptcy
was promulgated in Brazil until 1850, but protection to insolvent ﬁrms was
given to ﬁrms operating in speciﬁed sectors in order to stimulate investments
in those areas more likely to generate higher revenues for the Government.
A thorough and close investigation of the period’s legislation show that the
protective devices of a special legislation on bankruptcy aimed at encouraging
investments in speciﬁc sectors directly or indirectly connected with exports,
and, thus, with tax collection. In fact, not only sugar producers and miners
generally beneﬁted by such special legislation. Given that the conditions
faced by miners in the early decades of the Nineteenth Century required
large investments, incentives were created by means of special legislation on
bankruptcy to encourage the constitution of joint stock mining companies.
Similar reasons led the Government to extend bankruptcy beneﬁts to marine
insurance companies, as well as to the Bank of Brazil .
An examination of the legislation on bankruptcy established by the
Government of D. Jo˜ ao VI not only allows the incorporation of a new variable
to the study of economic development in the period, but also reveals some of
the purposes behind the economic policy enforced. Thus, this paper aims not
only to present the body of legislation on bankruptcy created or modiﬁed in the
period, but also to throw some light on the reasons behind such innovations.
By doing so, it hopes to contribute to a general review of the nature and
characteristics of D. Jo˜ ao VI’s protectionist economic policy in Brazil.
The ﬁrst section describes changes introduced into the Portuguese legislation
on bankruptcy law, before the arrival of D. Jo˜ ao VI in Brazil, with the
purpose of stimulating investments in those activities most capable of producing
revenues for metropolitan Portugal: gold mining and sugar production. The
increase of such protection for gold and sugar activities in the government of the
D. Jo˜ ao VI is examined in the following section. The third section investigates
the incentives provided for the constitution of capital partnerships and presents
the bankruptcy legislation for gold mining societies. The fourth section shows
how bankruptcy laws were adjusted to deal with the joint stock companies
authorized to be constituted in the period. The conclusions are presented in
the last section.
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2. Bankruptcy Laws in Colonial Brazil Previous to the Transfer of
the Portuguese Court to Brazil: Privileges for Miners and Sugar
Producers
In the colonial period, Portuguese laws were enforced in Brazil: the
Ordena¸ c˜ oes Manuelinas, from 1521 to 1603, and the Ordena¸ c˜ oes Filipinas,
thereafter. As to bankruptcy, this legislation did not establish a clear distinction
between insolvent individuals and insolvent ﬁrms, and did not show any special
concern in setting conditions for their rehabilitation.
The Alvar´ a of 13 November 1756, enacted by the Marquis of Pombal a year
after the Lisbon Earthquake, has been considered by some jurists a landmark in
the history of Brazilian legislation on bankruptcy by introducing “very original
and authentic proceedings in commercial courts restricted to merchants, traders
or business men”. 5 This alvar´ a had the purpose of rehabilitating credit in the
Lisbon market which had become chaotic in the wake of the earthquake of 1
November 1755, resulting in a great number of bankruptcies and encouraging
fraudulent actions on the part of debtors. 6
As a ﬁrst step, the bankrupt was to present himself before the Commercial
Court. On the same day – or, at the latest, on the following day – he was
supposed to pay his debts according to the contracts. He also had to declare
all his possessions, present his books with all entries chronologically registered,
declare under oath the causes of his insolvency and hand over the keys of his
establishment. After that, an inventory was to be made of all his possessions
that would be deposited in Court and entrusted to a businessman oﬃcially
nominated as depositary. Then, news about the bankruptcy was to be duly
published so that all those interested could make themselves known. Once
this ﬁrst stage was concluded, a lawsuit would be ﬁled. If the bankrupt were
considered guilty, he would be put in jail and submitted, later on, to a trial.
Finally, all the bankrupt’s possessions would be publicly auctioned. Out of the
liquid proceedings from such an auction, ten per cent would be put aside for
maintenance expenses of the bankrupt and his family, in case the bankruptcy
process was not considered fraudulent. The remaining liquid proceedings would
be distributed among the creditors.
In spite of the general bankruptcy legislation in force, new legal texts were
issued from time to time granting special privileges to some speciﬁc sectors that
the Government intended to protect and stimulate. In fact, as early as 1618 all
mining enterprises in the capitanias of S˜ ao Paulo and S. Vicente, independent
of their size were exempted from debt execution and impoundment. 7 Such
5 Waldemar Martins Ferreira, Institui¸ c˜ oes de Direito Comercial, 5
a ed., S˜ ao Paulo, 1955, p. 20.
Alvar´ a was a royal decision that, at least in principle, had a temporary character.
6 The main objectives of this Alvar´ a are stated in its introduction. This Alvar´ a gives a new
version to be enforced from then on, with the Title LXVI of the Ordena¸ c˜ oes Book V.
7 Alvar´ a of 8 August 1618, § 13.
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a privilege was part of a set of incentives to promote the discovery of new
gold deposits in the region. In the 1750’s, when, after reaching its peak, gold
production started to decline, this privilege was extended to all miners with
more than thirty slaves. 8
A signiﬁcant reduction in the revenues collected by the Portuguese
Government, resulting from the decrease in gold production in the second
half of the Eighteenth Century as well as from increasing tax evasion, led the
Government to intensify its protection for gold miners. As the decline in gold
production was seen to be a result of the exhaustion of deposits which could
be explored at low cost, the Government started stimulating the organization
of capital partnerships. Such partnerships were expected to be able to attract
the resources necessary for gold mining under the new circumstances.
The Alvar´ a of 13 May 1803 introduced a new regulation for the organization
and administration of diamond and gold mines in Brazil with the purpose
of increasing their production and discouraging tax evasion. This Alvar´ a
gave privileges to companies and capital partnerships, but did not include
any references to the bankruptcy regimes to be followed. According to the
ﬁrst paragraph of article VI, preference would be given to companies and
partnerships in the distribution of mineral lands that required more labour and
diligence. The following article prescribed, that in the case of large rivers, work
should be given to companies because “...for their work, much more larger
expenses are necessary, superior to the faculties of only one individual...”
These capital partnerships and companies were to be incorporated at
the initiative of the General Mining Intendant and supported by the
Administrative Council of Mines and the Governor of the capitania. The share
of those companies and partnerships would be divided among the partners or
shareholders according to the number of slaves they had provided. The expenses
would be shared by all shareholders according to the number of shares they
owned. 9 Even though this Alvar´ a made no innovations to the bankruptcy
legislation, it created strong incentives for the formation of companies and
capital partnerships in gold mining. Once partnerships under the format of
joint stock companies began to be formed, they required speciﬁc regulation
on bankruptcy. Such regulation was provided to each company through its
statutes.
Special bankruptcy legislation in the colonial period was not restricted to
gold mining; it was also extended to sugar producers. In accordance with the
Resolution of 22 September 1758, and the Provision of 26 April 1760, the
ownership of sugar mills and sugar farms in Rio de Janeiro was exempted from
execution and impoundment, claims being restricted to the proﬁts. In 1807,
8 Decree of 19 February 1752 and Resolution of 22 June 1758.
9 Alvar´ a of 13 May 1803, article VII, paragraph 3. Out of the 128 shares which would form the
company’s capital, two shares would go to the Government and were not subject to the payment
of expenses.
EconomiA, Selecta, Bras´ ılia (DF), v.7, n.4, p.99–121, December 2006 105Maria Teresa Ribeiro de Oliveira
these beneﬁts were extended to all Portuguese ultramarine dominions. 10
In the case of the gold mining sector, it is reasonable to assume that this
special legislation on bankruptcy encouraged investments, even though the
available data does not allow a quantitative measurement of such eﬀects. The
high degree of uncertainty associated with gold mining activities in this period
was reduced by the legal guarantee that the enterprise’s assets would not be
lost in case of bad luck and consequent bankruptcy of the owners. As the
capital value of the enterprise was almost always restricted to the value of the
slaves for whom there were alternative uses, it seems clear that such exemption
from execution and levy was welcomed by potential investors. Although slaves,
working or not, had to be clothed and fed, the costs of keeping an mine in
operation were relatively negligible. Thus, as variable costs were relatively low,
it is reasonable to think that a miner at this time did not have to resort to
loans for working capital. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that any adverse
eﬀects on the credit side, if any, were minor ones.
3. The Transfer of the Portuguese Court to Brazil and the
Maintenance of Protection for Gold and Sugar Activities by Means
of Special Legislation on Bankruptcy
Protection for gold and sugar production by means of special legislation on
bankruptcy was maintained during the Government of D. Jo˜ ao VI (1808-1821).
References in the literature to the economic policy enforced by the Government
of D. Jo˜ ao VI (1808-1821) have emphasized incentives given to industry. Such
emphasis is understandable, given that one of the ﬁrst measures adopted by
D. Jo˜ ao VI after his arrival in Rio was to abrogate the prohibition relating
to the production of cloth in Brazil. 11 Freedom given to industry and the
opening of Brazilian ports to international trade on 28 January 1808, may
suggest a departure from previous mercantilist policies. 12 However, an analysis
of the legislation makes it clear that the purposes of the economic policy
were still predominantly mercantilist. Brazil, either as a colony, or as part of
the Royal Kingdom of Portugal, was expected to continue producing primary
commodities and provide increased revenues for the Royal Treasury. The
study of this period’s legislation reveals these objectives and points out the
sectors that received greater incentives: iron and gold mining, transportation,
colonization and banking. This section will examine such incentives in order
to detect privileges related to special bankruptcy regimes in the case of gold
mining and sugar production.
10 Alvar´ a of 6 July 1807.
11 The Alvar´ a of D. Maria I on 5 January 1785 prohibited the production of cloth in Brazil, except
cloth for “use and dressing of slaves, for sacking and wrapping cloth and other similar uses.” By
the Alvar´ a of 28 April 1809 everyone in Brazil and in other Portuguese Domains became free to
establish any kind of manufacture in the country.
12 Carta R´ egia 28 January 1808.
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Reliable data on Brazilian exports during the colonial period are not
yet available. However, even if estimates from contemporary sources diverge
signiﬁcantly in absolute values, they tend to coincide in relative values. There
is no doubt that gold and sugar were responsible for most of Brazilian exports
during colonial times. 13 However, by the ﬁrst decade of the Nineteenth
Century, mining production was in frank decline and sugar exports, even
though in recovery, were far below levels reached in the Seventeenth Century.
Considering that the main source of revenues for the Government were taxes
on gold production and taxes levied upon imports and exports, it is no surprise
that, in spite of the growth of the domestic market and all measures taken
to tax it, mining and international trade received major attention from the
Government. Therefore, it is easy to understand why the Government of D.
Jo˜ ao VI would try to reverse the process of decline in mining production and to
create incentives for sugar exports. This was done not only by providing direct
privileges and incentives to these activities, but also to those connected with
the construction of the infrastructure necessary for the transport of exportable
goods.
Although protection given to all these sectors took diﬀerent forms, this paper
will restrict itself to examining one of them: special bankruptcy regimes.
3.1. Special bankruptcy regimes for miners
In 1813, miners who employed less than thirty slaves requested that privileges
related to exemption from execution and impoundment given to large-scale
miners in the 1750’s be extended to them. They claimed that, without such
beneﬁts, their businesses could hardly subsist. 14 The Alvar´ a, besides complying
with such requests, established other dispositions to be followed in the case
of bankruptcies in gold mining businesses. In fact, this was the ﬁrst piece of
legislation to deal exclusively with regulation of speciﬁc privileges granted to
bankrupt gold miners and to reveal an explicit concern for the rights of their
creditors. Among the justiﬁcations for the new legislation, not only are the
needs of the Royal Treasure, once more, invoked, but also the need to reconcile
the privileges granted to gold miners with those of their creditors.
This Alvar´ a had four articles. The ﬁrst one granted to all miners engaged in
gold production and employing any number of slaves the privilege of protection
from impoundment and levy in execution of debt of “...either their mines, or
their slaves, tools, instruments and other of their belongings”. Such privilege
covered all type of debts, including not only those incurred before the possession
and exploitation of mines, but also debts for which buildings, slaves, and
13 According to Simonsen these products would have been responsible for 88% of the exports in the
colonial period. Roberto C. Simonsen (1937), Hist´ oria Econˆ omica do Brasil (1500/1820), (6
th
edition), S˜ ao Paulo/Brazil: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1969, p. 381.
14 A reference to this appeal from small miners is in the introductory part of the Alvar´ a of 17
November 1813.
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tools had been given as guarantees. The article following makes it clear that
such privileges would also comprehend ﬁscal debts. The last two articles were
concerned with creditors’ rights and show that the purpose of the legislation
was not to protect individuals, but to keep the gold mines in operation.
In fact, the third article stipulated that, in order to be reimbursed, creditors
would have to look to other possessions of the debtor for securing repayment
of debt. Among those possessions could be included one third of the business’s
proﬁts. 15 The fourth article introduced the possibility of impoundment and
execution of gold mining establishments. Such establishments would be liable to
levy and execution if their values were equal or inferior to their owners’ debts. In
this case, plots of land, slaves, tools and remaining belongings could be subject
to levy and sale upon execution under the condition that the establishment
was neither destroyed nor bought by one person alone. If there was no bid at
the auction, the ownership of the establishment would go to the creditor, who
could neither close it down nor divide it. 16
The requirements for debt proceedings against a mining establishment in
this Alvar´ a make it clear that the spirit of the legislation was not to protect
creditors, in the case of insolvency of miners, but to establish certain rules
to avoid reduction in gold production. Any lessening in gold production
would cause a signiﬁcant decrease in revenues collected. As mentioned in
the introduction to the Alvar´ a, one reason for its publication was the Prince
Regent’s wish “to promote the increase of this important branch of the mining
sector, which is the source of the prosperity of my States and of revenues for
my Royal Crown”.
Doubts about the real meaning of the expression “remaining belongings”
used in the Alvar´ a of 1813 led to another Alvar´ a, in 1819, that speciﬁed what
exactly should be understood by this term: miners’ houses built on the mine
lands they exploited, repair shops, windmills, store houses for preparing and
storing food for slaves as well as the stores kept in them, animals, and anything
else necessary for the operations of the mine. 17 Given that many gold miners
were evading the payment of taxes on gold, the privileges of the 1813 Alvar´ a
became restricted, in 1820, to those bankrupt miners who could prove, with
documents duly authenticated by the competent oﬃce, that they had taken
their production to places authorized to melt the gold and to extract that
portion due as taxes. In addition, creditors would be allowed to show that
miners who had failed to do so be denied such privileges and forced to pay
them. 18
15 Alvar´ a of 17 November 1813 , article 3.
16 Alvar´ a of 17 November 1813, article 4.
17 Alvar´ a of 8 July 1819.
18 Alvar´ a of 28 September 1820.
108 EconomiA, Selecta, Bras´ ılia (DF), v.7, n.4, p.99–121, December 2006Economic Policies and Bankruptcy Institutions: Brazil in a Period of Transition
3.2. Special bankruptcy regimes for sugar cane producers
Special bankruptcy privileges for sugar producers were also maintained and
ampliﬁed during the Government of D. Jo˜ ao VI. The Alvar´ a enacted on 21
January 1809 responded to a plea from small sugar producers, who requested
that privileges conceded to sugar producers of the Capitania of Rio de Janeiro
in the 1750s be extended to all producers. The Alvar´ a of 1809 makes it clear
that the main purpose of the Government was to create a legal apparatus
that would allow producers facing ﬁnancial diﬃculties to continue to work. In
fact, the beneﬁts for the economy, for the Government and for creditors in
maintaining the continuing operation of these establishments are emphasized
in the text:
“in the present circumstances of great weakness in Commerce, it would be
convenient to my service that the use of the mentioned privilege were more largely
extended to the farmers able to keep their establishments at work for the general
utility of the inhabitants of this State and in favour of the culture what conciliated
with the interests of their creditors”
In fact, this Alvar´ a reaﬃrms the privileges of exemption from impoundment
and execution of the ownership of sugar mills and farms operating regularly and
the limitation of a possible debt execution to one third of the establishment’s
yield. It also allows the possibility of execution of writs when the debt was
equal or greater than the value of the sugar cane farm or the sugar mill, and
establishes that the evaluation of the mills should include slaves, cattle, lands
and tools. In this case, debt proceedings should follow the rules prescribed by
the law of 20 June 1774. However, this Alvar´ a introduces an extra protection
for the creditor. Referring to paragraph 3 of the Alvar´ a of 1807, it determines
that, in order to prove that debts had reached the value required for proceeding
with debt execution, the creditor could add other debts incurred by the debtor.
But in order to do so, certain procedures were to be followed by the creditor.
The Alvar´ a of 21 January 1814 made it clear that ﬁscal debts were included in
the privileges conceded to sugar cane and sugar producers.
4. D. Jo˜ ao VI’s Incentives for the Constitution of Capital
Partnerships and his Bankruptcy Legislation for Gold Mining
Societies
As discussed above, the Portuguese Government had started to encourage the
constitution of capital partnerships for gold exploration even before the transfer
of the Portuguese Court to Brazil. This same policy was pursued by D. Jo˜ ao
VI. In a Carta R´ egia to the Governor of the Capitania of Minas Gerais on 12
August 1817, D. Jo˜ ao VI remarks that “the state of decadence of the works in
the gold mines, each day more expensive, not only because most of the lands
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easy to be worked on have already been worked on, but mainly because miners
do not have the necessary practical mining knowledge”. In order to facilitate
the introduction of new technology, he ordered that stock capital partnerships
should be constituted in Minas Gerais. The constitution of those partnerships
was to be at the initiative of the Mining General Inspector or his substitute and
should occur under the authority of the Governor of the capitania. The statutes
to be adopted by those partnerships, signed by the Minister and Secretary of
State for Internal Aﬀairs, were enclosed with the Carta R´ egia. 19
Even though the format of these partnerships, as suggested by the statutes,
are similar in many ways to the usual structure of joint stock companies, there
is no explicit mention of the restriction of the shareholders’ responsibility
to the value of their shares, one of the main characteristics of the joint
stock companies. Besides, it was made clear that shareholders would not have
any right to interfere in the management of partnership. 20 An interesting
peculiarity of these societies was that the value of the share was expressed
in terms of money and in the number of slaves. According to article III,
each share would correspond to 400$000, or to “three young and healthy
slaves aged from 16 to 26 years.” As to the privileges to be given to those
partnerships, the preference accorded them in the distribution of any mineral
lands to be discovered, granted by the Alvar´ a of 1803, was reaﬃrmed. 21
Besides, they would be able to use the services of mining specialists who
had been brought from Germany by the Government. Government expenses
in the partnership would be reimbursed by the proﬁts corresponding to one
or two shares, according to the size of the ﬁrm. 22 A major indication of the
Government’s great interest in encouraging investments in gold mining is given
by article XV, which concedes a tax reduction on gold production from 20%
to 10%, two years after the ﬁrm had begun operations, and as long as it was
proved that the appropriate technology had been used. This Alvar´ a may be
seen as one of the ﬁrst attempts of the Brazilian Government to launch public
and private partnerships.
According to article XV of the statute, shares could be transferred, by sale,
inheritance, or by impoundment, but the new owner would not be allowed
to withdraw either the money or the slaves. In the case of insolvency of one
shareholder, the slaves corresponding to his shares could not be sold for the
payment of his debts. However, the ownership of those shares could go to his
creditors, who would receive all corresponding dividends. Thus the creditor’s
rights to receive the payment from their credits were postponed to the future
and the value to be received became uncertain. It is also worth considering that,
inasmuch as they were constituted as joint stock companies, the peculiarities
19 Estatutos para as sociedades das lavras das minas de ouro, que se h˜ ao de estabelecer na
Capitania de Minas Geraes enclosed to the Carta R´ egia of 12 August 1817.
20 Estatutos para as sociedades das lavras, art. II.
21 Estatutos para as sociedades das lavras, art. V.
22 Estatutos para as sociedades das lavras, art. IX.
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of such partnerships have to be taken into consideration. In a joint stock
company, the responsibility of a shareholder is restricted to the value of his
shares. Therefore, in principle, if the bankrupt shareholder’s possessions were
subject to debt proceedings, this would mean impoundment of that part of
the assets of the company corresponding to the value of his shares. In the case
of gold mining and sugar farms and mills, such debt executions were already
prohibited by the legislation in force. In other undertakings that did not have
such protection could the shares of bankrupt shareholders be entrusted to a
depositary and afterwards sold in public auction, the proceeds from such sale
reverting to the creditors? Considering the non-existence of a capital market,
this could hardly be a solution.
Even though the responsibility of a shareholder was limited to the value of
his shares, his property rights were not restricted to shares, but encompassed
dividends distributed to shareholders. Could then the property rights on those
future dividends be credited to shareholders? No general legal solution was
given to this problem, leading companies to create their own rules regarding
the matter. Those rules were included into their statutes and were therefore
subject to Government’s approval. In fact, by then, any joint company in Brazil,
in order to exist legally, had to be authorized in order to function and have
its statutes approved by the Government. Thus, each company created its own
bankruptcy regime.
The transfer of a share corresponds to a change in the ownership of
part of the physical assets of a ﬁrm. If the shares could be seized and
liquidated, the continued operations of a ﬁrm would be jeopardized. Therefore,
in order to assure protection, joint stock companies introduced dispositions in
their statutes giving their shareholders the privilege of exemption from debt
execution and levy against their shares.
5. Joint Stock Companies Authorized by D. Jo˜ ao VI
Joint stock companies facilitate the assemblage of ﬁnancial resources from
the private sector and they have been used by various governments in diﬀerent
countries to attract savings for investments considered a priority. In order to
induce the private sector to invest in such undertakings, and to make feasible
government projects, diﬀerent beneﬁts and privileges are oﬀered to investors. It
has been no diﬀerent in Brazil and this role played by joint stock companies in
carrying out economic policies is not new. Trade companies created in the early
colonial period to operate in Brazil certainly helped the PortugueseGovernment
achieve its mercantilist goals.
Until 1882, authorization from the government was a necessary condition for
incorporating any joint stock company in Brazil, even though the need for such
authorization was only regulated in 1849. The requirement of such approval
created the grounds for the establishment of public and private partnerships.
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On one hand, the format of joint stock companies was in itself attractive to
individual investors, as it created further possibilities for their investments.
On the other hand, the need for authorization provided the government with
means to attract such savings for projects of its own interest. In fact, the
acquiescence of the private sector in entering into these partnerships was
many times obtained by conceding various beneﬁts to shareholders and to the
company.
This section lists (Table 1) all the joint stock companies authorized to be
constituted in the period and investigates the bankruptcy regime adopted by
them. At this point it should be noted that, in spite of the requirement of
legal authorization, some companies were organized and operating without such
permission. Therefore it should be pointed out that the list presented does not
comprise all joint companies in operation.
Table 1
Joint stock companies authorized by D. Jo˜ ao VI (1808-1821)
Years Legal Company name Object of the Companies
document companies headquarters
1808 Decreto Cia de Seguros Boa F´ e Maritime City of Bahia
24/02/1808 insurance
1808 Alvar´ a Banco do Brazil Deposit discount City of
12/10/1808 and issue Rio de Janeiro
1808 Carta R´ egia Cia de Seguros Maritime City of Bahia
24/10/1808 Conceito P´ ublico insurance
1810 Decis˜ ao N.5 Cia de Seguros Maritime City of
05/02/1810 Mar´ ıtmos Inemnidade insurance Rio de Janeiro
1817 Carta R´ egia Cia de Minera¸ c˜ ao Gold Mining Na
16/01/1817 do Cuyab´ a
1819 Decis˜ ao N.55 Sociedade de Agricultura Fluvial Na
15/12/1819 Commercio e transportation
Navega¸ c˜ ao do Rio Doce
1821 Carta R´ egia Cia de Minera¸ c˜ ao Gold Mining Na
21/02/1821 dos Anicuns
Sources: Legislation and companies’ statutes mentioned in the text.
As shown in Table 1, only seven joint stock companies received legal
approval in the period 1801-1821: three marine insurance companies, two
gold mining companies, one bank and one river transportation company. How
those companies protected themselves against the unfavourable eﬀects of the
legislation, in case of a future bankruptcy, is investigated in the following
sub-sections.
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5.1. The maritime insurance companies
As shown in Table 1, only three joint-stock maritime insurance companies
were authorized to be constituted in this period. It has been mentioned in
the literature that seven insurance companies were formed in the city of
Rio de Janeiro during the government of D. Jo˜ ao VI. 23 Either some of the
four companies were not constituted as joint-stock companies or they were
informally constituted as such, but did not receive government approval.
The provision of maritime insurance services, in high demand in an economy
specializing in the production of commodities for exports and based on African
slave labour could hardly be ﬁnanced by one individual. Therefore, it is to
be expected that those services were oﬀered by ﬁrms constituted by capital
partnerships. Besides, considering that such services responded to pressing
needs from export and import merchants, they did not require from the
government special privileges in order to be constituted.
As soon as D. Jo˜ ao VI arrived in Bahia, he signed a decree authorizing the
constitution of a maritime insurance company , the Companhia de Seguros
Boa F´ e. According to the text of the decree such authorization was needed
by the merchants of the city of Bahia. 24 Article 4 of this company’s statute
characterizes this company as a joint stock company: “the shareholders’
responsibility does not go beyond the value of their shares.”
Insurance companies presented, then, peculiar characteristics. They required
very little investment in physical assets and their operational costs were
relatively low. Therefore, the company’s capital corresponded mostly to the
amount of available ﬁnancial resources eventually needed for the payment of
insurance premiums. In consequence, shareholders joining the company were
not required to pay for the whole value of their shares. This meant that a
signiﬁcant part of the capital remained with the shareholders and away from
the control of the management of the company.
Assuming that an insurance company was well managed and responsibilities
beyond its ability to pay were not undertaken, it could be expected that a
temporary liquidity diﬃculty be solved by the payment of unpaid shares. If
some shareholders refused to do so and the ﬁrm went bankrupt, there were
no possessions that could be subject to debt execution and levy as the ﬁrm’s
capital did not correspond to its physical assets. If the company’s capital was
inferior to its debts, there was no way shareholders possessions could be seized
and sold because, in a joint company, the shareholder’s responsibility would
not exceed the values of his shares. Besides, impoundment and execution of
shares belonging to an individual bankrupt shareholder would be a complicated
23 Lenira M.Martinho and Riva Gorenstein, (1993), Negociantes e caixeiros na sociedade da
Independˆ encia, Rio de Janeiro/Brazil: Secretaria Municipal de Cultura, Turismo e Esportes,
Departamento Geral de Documenta¸ c˜ ao e Informa¸ c˜ ao Cultural, Divis˜ ao de Editora¸ c˜ ao, pp. 160.
24 Decree of February 24, 1808. D. Jo˜ ao disembarked at the City of Bahia on January 24, 1808.
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process whenever those shares had not been paid for. Thus, trust among
shareholders was the basis of such companies. Consequently, it would be
reasonable to expect that insurance capital partnerships, joint stock or not,
were formed by a small group of individuals linked to each other by family,
friendship or business ties, those ties being more important than the format of
the association among them. In fact, this seems to have been the case. 25 There
is some evidence that, besides these three joint stock companies, formal and
informal partnerships were formed in the cities of Bahia and Rio de Janeiro to
operate as insurance business. 26
In the case of Companhia de Seguros Boa F´ e, protection against bankruptcy
given to investors – besides limiting the shareholder’s responsibility to the
amount of his shares, given to investors in any joint stock company – were
the severe penalties to be imposed on shareholders who refused to pay for their
shares whenever they were asked. Its capital was ﬁxed at 400 contos and the
statute did not establish any deadline for the payment of the shares to the
company. 27 This payment would only become mandatory when the amount
of ﬁnancial resources kept by the company were insuﬃcient to pay for the
losses of the insured. In this case, shareholders were supposed to pay for their
shares, within eight days, the value required to cover the company’s debts – the
responsibility of each shareholder being proportional to the number of shares
he had subscribed. Should a shareholder refuse to comply with his obligations,
he would be immediately expelled from the company without any rights. 28
Another insurance company authorized to be established in 1808 in the city
of Bahia was the Companhia de Seguros Conceito P´ ublico, also an enterprise
of local traders. 29
The ﬁrst joint stock maritime insurance company formed in the city of
Rio de Janeiro, the Companhia de Seguros Mar´ ıtmos Indemnidade, received
Government approval in 1810. 30 According to the company statutes, each
shareholder was to immediately pay a value corresponding to 10% of the shares
he had subscribed, the remaining amount being paid whenever required by the
circumstances. 31 The process of oﬃcial approval of this company’s statutes
25 Manolo Florentino, in Em Costas Negras: Uma hist´ oria do tr´ aﬁco de escravos entre a ´ Africa e
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 1997, p. 126–128, calls attention to the great demand for insurance
services from the slave-trade between ´ Africa and Brazil. According to him, the insurance business
in the city of Rio de Janeiro was mainly ﬁnanced by slave-traders.
26 Manolo Florentino, op.cit, p. 128 mentions ten insurance companies operating in the city of Rio
de Janeiro in 1829.
27 Condi¸ c˜ oes da Companhia de Seguros da cidade da Bahia, article 2. These statutes were
enclosed in the Decree of February 24, 1808.
28 Condi¸ c˜ oes da Companhia, art. 11.
29 Carta R´ egia of October 24, 1808. The statutes have yet to be located.
30 N. 5 BRAZIL Resolu¸ c˜ ao de consulta da Real Junta do Commercio, Agricultura, Fabricas e
Navega¸ c˜ ao de 5 de fevereiro de 1810.
31 Although this capital partnership carried the name of the company, usually given to partnerships
constituted as joint stock companies, the responsibility of the shareholder was not restricted to the
value of the shares.
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reveals the Government’s concern with the creditors’ rights. According to a
statement from the Junta do Commercio Agricultura, Fabricas e Navega¸ c˜ ao
that supported D. Jo˜ ao VI’s decision, the statutes originally presented had to
be modiﬁed in order to make all shareholders responsible for the company’s
capital in case some of them went bankrupt. The Junta emphasized that the
mutual trust among shareholders that allowed them to keep ninety per cent of
the value of the shares to be used in their own beneﬁt should not be detrimental
to the insured. Similarly, problems caused by issuing insurance policies in excess
of the company’s capital should not be harmful to the insured. Accordingly, in
the statutes approved, the responsibility of shareholders was “in solidum”, not
only in relation to the capital of their shares, but also in relation to everything
they exposed to risks. 32 “The shareholder who did not fulﬁl his obligations
relating to the payment of their shares would lose his right to past proﬁts,
would share the responsibility for losses brought on the company by adverse
conditions and would be subject to the payment of interest”. 33
5.2. The Bank of Brazil
The transfer of the Portuguese Court to Brazil made radical institutional
monetary and ﬁscal reforms imperative. The scarcity of currency in circulation
increased with the intensiﬁcation of international trade after the opening of
Brazilian ports on January 28, 1808. A monetary reform was necessary to
introduce liquidity to the economy so as to support the expansion of commercial
activities. Increased administrative expenses to be made in Brazil, as well as the
ﬁnancial diﬃculties faced by a home country at war, also created a substantial
need for new sources of government revenue. An examination of the legislation
enacted in the period shows that an increase in the ﬁnancial resources at
disposal of the Royal Treasure was in fact the main objective of D. Jo˜ ao VI’s
economic policy. Not only were a great variety of new taxes levied, but those
activities most able to generate public revenues, such as, for instance, mining,
were stimulated. In this context, the establishment of a public bank in Brazil
to provide ﬁnancial resources for the Royal Treasure and to increase money
circulation was seen as a top-priority measure to be taken by D. Jo˜ ao VI’s
Government as soon as the Portuguese Court was installed in Rio de Janeiro.
The Alvar´ a of October 12, 1808, ordered the establishment of a public bank in
the city of Rio de Janeiro.
Unable to ﬁnance such undertaking, the Government had necessarily to turn
to private investors and this ﬁrst public bank may be seen as the ﬁrst example
32 Condi¸ c˜ oes da Companhia de Seguros – Indemnidade conﬁrmadas por sua Alteza Real
o Pr´ ıncipe Regente Nosso Senhor, pela immediata Resolu¸ c˜ ao de 5 de fevereiro de 1810,
estabelecida nesta pra¸ ca do Rio de Janeiro pelos necgociantes abaixo declarados, enclosed to
N. 5 BRAZIL Resolu¸ c˜ ao de consulta da Real Junta do Commercio, art. 2.
33 Condi¸ c˜ oes da Companhia de Seguros – Indemnidade, article 3.
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of a private and public partnership. 34 According to the statutes enclosed to the
Alvar´ a and signed by the Minister of Finances on October 8, 1808 the bank,
denominated Banco do Brasil, would be formed by a joint stock company.
In fact, its capital would be divided into shares, and the responsibility of
the shareholder would be limited to the value of his shares. 35 Although a
joint company to be constituted with private savings, the bank to be created
was basically a public undertaking. Government interference in the creation
of the bank was not limited to the initiative behind its establishment and
the elaboration of the statutes. The company’s statutes created conditions for
governmental interference in the administration and management of the bank,
and limited shareholders’ rights. 36
As far as bankruptcy is concerned, this company introduced a signiﬁcant
innovation. According to its statutes, “any impoundment or execution, either
ﬁscal or civil on the bank’s shares was null and prohibited”. 37 No other clauses
of the statutes mentioned any rights of bankrupt shareholders’ creditors either
to future dividends or past proﬁts. Notwithstanding this protection assured to
the shareholders by the statutes, the Government had diﬃculty in attracting
private savings to constitute the bank’s capital. The legislation in this period, as
well as some contemporary stories, reveal that pressures of varying natures were
used to force people to subscribe shares. Historians dealing with the creation
of the ﬁrst Banco do Brasil have described the most bizarre concessions and
privileges oﬀered to subscribers, but none of them mentions those related to a
special regime of bankruptcy. In fact, protection oﬀered by the statutes was not
enough to encourage private investors in the ﬁrst years to be willing to allocate
their savings to this Government undertaking.
5.3. The gold mining companies: Companhia de Minera¸ c˜ ao do Cuyab´ a and
Companhia de Minera¸ c˜ ao dos Anicuns
Considering that very few capital partnerships were legally constituted in the
sector of gold mining, the bankruptcy legislation promulgated until 1817 dealt
exclusively with the properties of the mining establishment and did not mention
what would happen to the shares of bankrupt shareholders. The constitution
of those companies followed, in general, the legislation on gold mining in force
34 The creation of the Bank of Brazil, attending not only to the demands from the government
but also from those dealing with commerce, implied a very signiﬁcant institutional change that
would have, in the short and long run, critical direct and indirect eﬀects over future institutional
arrangements.
35 Alvar´ a of October 12, 1808.
36 Estatutos para o Banco Publico estabelecido em virtude do Alvar´ a de 12 de Outubro de 1808
enclosed to the Alvar´ a of October 18, 1808, articles IX to XIII. The ﬁrst directors and the members
of the of the Bank Board were nominated by the Decree of January 24, 1809.
37 Estatutos para o Banco Publico estabelecido em virtude do Alvar´ a de 12 de Outubro de 1808,
art. VI. Those statutes were signed by D. Fernando Jos´ e de Portugal, appointed Minister of Finance
by the decree of March 26, 1808.
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which imposed a great degree of government interference in their management
in order to assure the collection of taxes due from increased gold production.
The Companhia de Minera¸ c˜ ao do Cuyab´ a was the ﬁrst joint stock gold
mining company to have its statutes oﬃcially approved by the Government.
These statutes, sent by the Governor of the capitania of Matto Grosso for royal
approval on 31 May 1814, were approved by the Carta R´ egia of 16 January
1817, eight months before the new legislation regulating the constitution of
capital partnerships to explore gold in Minas Gerais was enacted. The approval
of such a document reveals not only the persistent interest of the Government
in the constitution of capital partnerships to exploit gold mines, but also in
extending such operations to areas outside the Capitania of Minas Gerais. The
reason for such interest was once more made explicit in the text: the possibility
that these undertakings would increase revenues collected through taxation.
In fact, in this document, D. Jo˜ ao VI refers to “the advantages that such
establishment may bring to my Royal Treasury”.38
The capital of the company was to be formed by shares, each share
corresponding to 100$000 in currency to be paid at the time of subscription and
two slaves dressed and equipped with tools to be handed over to the company
as soon as the mining operations had began. The payments in currency would
be used to ﬁnance the preliminary works necessary to prepare the mines to be
exploited. 39
As the mining activities, up to then, were not constituted – at least oﬃcially
– as capital partnerships, legislation in force related to the consequences of
bankruptcy was restricted to the properties and proﬁts of the mining business.
According to the legislation in force as given by the Alvar´ as of November 17,
1813 and July 8,1819, mining establishments were only subject to execution
for debt under very special conditions, while proﬁts subject to debt execution
were limited to one third of the total.
The adoption of the joint company as a format for new capital partnerships
in the sector introduced the possibility of increasing the protection given to
creditors of bankrupt miners. This protection was given, not by any general
law, but by the statutes of the company seeking Government approval. That
these companies to be formed would demonstrate great interest in safeguarding
creditors’ rights is easy to understand. Those companies were created to
explore gold deposits of more diﬃcult access and, thus, expected to incur
larger expenses. Not only would equipment have to be imported, but also the
assistance of foreign technicians was required. Such new operations would be
more dependent on credit. Thus, the company’s statutes not only had to provide
incentives for a large number of individuals to invest in the new undertaking,
but also had to safeguard creditors’ rights.
38 Carta R´ egia of January 16, 1817.
39 Estatutos para o Governo da Companhia de Minera¸ c˜ ao do Cuyab´ a, enclosed in the Carta
R´ egia of January 16, 1817.
EconomiA, Selecta, Bras´ ılia (DF), v.7, n.4, p.99–121, December 2006 117Maria Teresa Ribeiro de Oliveira
In the case of the Companhia de Minera¸ c˜ ao do Cuyab´ a, its statutes gave
greater protection to both debtors and creditors. The dispositions of the statues
of the Carta R´ egia of 12 August 1817 regulating the establishment of companies
to explore gold mines to be established in Minas Gerais, had admitted, in
its article XIV, the possibility of impoundment of the companies’ shares. 40
In the case of the Companhia de Minera¸ c˜ ao do Cuyab´ a such possibility was
drastically denied: “The shares of this company are exempted of any ﬁscal or
civil impoundment or from the Judge of Orphans, Deceased and Absents.” 41 In
spite of the legislation in force that limited the possibility of creditor’s rights
to debt levy and execution on gold mining proﬁts to one third, the statutes
of the Companhia de Minera¸ c˜ ao do Cuyab´ a did not establish such a limit. 42
However, as one sixth of the proﬁts owed to each subscriber were to be kept on
reserve by the company, the creditor’s appropriation limit decreased, in fact,
from one third to one sixth. According to article X of its statutes, the debtors’
shares would not be transferred to the creditor, but his debts would be paid by
future dividends on his shares: “The creditors’ rights will be restricted to the
proﬁts coming from these shares, requiring them only when they are distributed
to all shareholders”.
The Carta R´ egia of 21 February 1821 approved the statutes of another
gold mining joint stock company, the Companhia de Minera¸ c˜ ao dos Anicuns.
This company replaced a previous unsuccessful partnership that had been
constituted with the purpose of mining for gold in this province but had gone
into bankruptcy. In his letter to the governorof the capitania giving his approval
to the constitution of a new company, D. Jo˜ ao VI complained about “the
meager proﬁts My Royal Finances have taken from the rich discovery of the
Anicuns under the management of the previous partnership.” 43
The value of a share of the new company would correspond to 12$000 and
one slave between 16 to 35 years of age, free from disease, and dressed and
equipped with tools. 44
Even though legislation concerning privileges given to gold miners in 1813
and 1819 did not take into account the peculiarities of societies constituted
as capital partnerships, the statutes of these new companies extended to their
shares the privileges of not being subject to debt levy and execution. In fact,
according to article 48 of its statutes, their shareholders, so far as their shares
and respective proﬁts were concerned, would enjoy the privileges granted by
the Alvar´ as of November 17, 1813 and July 8, 1819.
40 Estatutos para as Sociedades das lavras das minas de ouro, que se h˜ ao de estabelecer na
Capitania de Minas Geraes, enclosed to the Carta R´ egia, August 12, 1817.
41 Estatutos para o Governo da Companhia de Minera¸ c˜ ao do Cuyab´ a, enclosed to the Carta
R´ egia of January 16, 1817, article X.
42 Alvar´ a de 17 de Novembro de 1813, artigo 3.
43 Carta Regia of February 21, 1821.
44 Estatutos para a companhia de Minera¸ c˜ ao dos Anicuns na Prov´ ıncia de Goyaz, enclosed with
the Carta R´ egia of February 21, 1821.
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5.4. Sociedade de Agricultura Commercio and Navega¸ c˜ ao do Rio Doce
The Government’s concern in promoting activities able to produce higher
public revenues, one of the outstanding characteristics of D. Jo˜ ao VI’s economic
policy, implied other measures in addition to granting privileges and concessions
to sugar and gold producers. Taxes on imports were another signiﬁcant source
of income. In this context, the development of a transport system that created
conditions for an intensiﬁcation of the import and export trade was seen as an
important goal. It is in this context that the great interest of the Government in
colonizing the north-eastern regions of Minas Gerais and in opening roads from
Minas to the ports of the capitania of Esp´ ırito Santo should be understood.
On one hand, those lands and rivers were expected to contain rich deposits of
gold. On the other hand, the establishment of l navigation on the river Rio
Doce would allow the old gold regions of the central areas of Minas Gerais and
the potential gold areas of the north-eastern areas access to the sea ports of
the Esp´ ırito Santo capitania. Such possibilities may explain the Government’s
persistence in ﬁghting the indigenous people who lived in the region and
in promoting the colonization of the region. 45 The policies implemented by
the Government were not successful. It was only in 1819 that a company –
Sociedade Agricultura Commercio e Navega¸ c˜ ao do Rio Doce – was constituted
with the purpose of promoting navigation on this river by oﬀering transport
and trade services.
In the process of obtaining governmental approval for its statutes, some
modiﬁcations had to be made to the company’s proposal. One of these
alterations was related to the article dealing with the vulnerability of the
company’s shares to debt levy and execution. According to the legal text that
approved the company’s statutes, the shareholders’ payments to the company
were completely subject to debt levy and execution. Legal procedures for levy
and execution on the resources of the shareholders up to the value of their debts,
and in accordance with judicial decision, could be taken by their creditors.
However, these resources could not be withdrawn from the company, but the
subrogated creditors would have the right to receive the dividends whenever
distributed and under the same conditions of the other shareholders. The same
procedure would apply to ﬁscal creditors.
6. Final Remarks and Conclusions
The study of legislation on bankruptcy passed by D. Jo˜ ao VI suggests that
the development of a manufacturing sector in Brazil was neither the only nor,
perhaps, the major concern of the Portuguese administration of Brazil, contrary
to what has been emphasized in the literature. In fact, this legislation would
45 Carta R´ egia of May 13, 1808.
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seem to imply that the Government gave great attention to the development
of activities related directly or indirectly to exports. Thus, neither the opening
of Brazilian ports to international trade nor ﬁscal protection for manufactures
should be viewed as an abandonment of mercantilist policies. Freedom to trade
and establish domestic manufactures were more the result of diﬃculties faced by
a metropolitan Portugal occupied by French troops, than of a sudden adherence
to the liberal ideas of Adam Smith. In fact, legislation of the period reveals
constant interference by the Government in the economy.
The investigation of legislation on bankruptcy enacted in the period conﬁrms
this point of view. This legislation was used as a device – among many others –
to induce investment in activities able to produce, in a shorter period of time,
greater resources for the Royal Treasury. Such activities were seen as those
oriented to the supply of commodities in great demand in European markets:
gold and sugar. The acceptance of Smith’s theory of comparative advantages
did not imply adherence to the classical principle of non-intervention of the
State in the economy.
In this context, legislation on bankruptcy of sugar and gold mining
establishments would have operated to create incentives for new investments.
As long as such activities were not highly dependent on credit, legislation
tended to give higher protection to bankrupt producers so as to keep their
establishments at work. In the case of mineral producers, some regard to
creditor’s rights was shown once the degree of insolvency of an establishment
became too high, and thus creating the possibility of a reduction in production.
The legislation of 1813 granting such protection to creditors was introduced
in a period when the gold production began to require more sophisticated
technology and thus became more dependent on credit.
Once capital partnerships began to be formed as joint stock companies and
the physical assets of an establishment were not owned by one individual,
changes had to be made to the rules to be applied in case the company, or some
of the shareholders, became insolvent. Such changes were not made through
special legislation for joint stock companies, but through the statutes of these
companies. As the constitution of a company was subject to oﬃcial approval
of their statues, a channel was opened for Government interference.
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